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INTERNATIONAL LAW AND CHILDREN’S 
HUMAN RIGHTS:  INTERNATIONAL, 
CONSTITUTIONAL, AND POLITICAL 
CONFLICTS BLOCKING PASSAGE OF THE 
CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE 
CHILD 
John J. Garman* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The rights of children were recognized in American constitutional 
law when the Supreme Court held that “neither the Fourteenth 
Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone.”1  The notion of 
“children’s rights” has developed into a term involving the personal 
freedoms of children, parents’ authority over children, and the state’s 
responsibilities regarding children.2  The Supreme Court has recognized 
that children are persons with rights; however, the current movement of 
the Court has been towards increasing the rights of parents over the 
child.3  Currently the extent of the basic rights of children in the United 
States remains unsettled.4 
Children’s rights also exist as international law in the form of 
conventional law and customary law.  Conventional law primarily 
consists of treaties entered into by sovereign states as a result of domestic 
ratification that impose legal duties only on those states that become 
parties to the treaties.  In contrast, customary law comes from the general 
practice of states and can be legally binding on all states that have not 
objected to the rule as it was developed.   
The primary issue to be addressed in this Article is whether or not 
the United States is prepared to adhere to the international call for 
children’s rights.  The first Part will look at what some scholars have 
called the post-Cold War era “age of globalization” where there are no 
                                                 
*  Associate Professor of Law, Faulkner University Jones School of Law.  LL.M., 
Université de Droit, d’Economie et des Sciences d’Aix-Marseille; J.D., Vanderbilt 
University; B.A., David Lipscomb College.  This Article would not have been possible 
without the research and editorial assistance of Christopher O’Gwynn. 
1 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967). 
2 Roger J.R. Levesque, International Children’s Rights Grow Up: Implications for 
Jurisprudence and Domestic Policy, 24 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 193, 193 (1994). 
3 Id. 
4 Id. 
Garman: International Law and Children's Human Rights:  International, Co
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2007
660 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41 
boundaries to conflict and a complex new order based on 
Institutionalism has replaced the Realist world dominated by sovereign 
states for so many decades.5  In a world that, despite recent unilateral 
United States action, seems to be tumbling ever closer towards resolving 
its problems more through institutions rather than the old “man versus 
man” approach, the United States is lagging behind the global effort of 
establishing international standards for human rights and children’s 
rights.  The United States appears to be clinging to old Realist notions 
that any international human rights law would affect its status as the 
sole global superpower.  The result is a lack of involvement and a global 
voice for the United States for human rights and children’s rights in the 
institutions that seek to further these causes.  The United States’ lack of 
involvement “weakens America’s voice as a principled defender of 
human rights around the world and diminishes America’s moral 
influence and stature.”6   
The second Part will look at the human rights treaties pertaining to 
the rights of the child, and in particular at the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child.  The continuing reluctance of the 
United States to participate will be discussed, and issues of global and 
domestic politics will be analyzed as possible stumbling blocks to 
ratification.  Finally this Article will discuss customary and conventional 
international law and the Supremacy Clause7 of the United States 
Constitution.  The ultimate purpose is to answer the question of whether 
or not the United States is prepared to adhere to the international call for 
children’s rights, starting at a global level, by discussing theories of 
international relations and the treaties themselves, and at the domestic 
level, by discussing the Supremacy Clause as it pertains to conventional 
and customary law.  
II.  TWO THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS:   
A REVIEW OF REALIST THEORY AND INSTITUTIONAL THEORY 
A. Realist Theory 
The purpose of Part II is to provide the historical development of 
international relations theory, particularly focusing on the development 
of Realist and Institutional theory.  It is important to discuss the 
                                                 
5 Harold Hongju Koh, A United States Human Rights Policy for the 21st Century, 46 ST. 
LOUIS U. L.J. 293, 303 (2002). 
6 Kenneth Roth, The Charade of US Ratification of International Human Rights Treaties, 1 
CHI. J. INT’L L. 347, 347 (2000). 
7 U.S. CONST. art. VI. 
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similarities between Realist and Institutional thought as well as provide 
the major differences in order to show what motivates a country to act in 
the international community.  In the post-World War II era, international 
relations has seen a “schizophrenic battle” between believers in 
cooperation between nations and those who believe such cooperation is 
“unachievable and undesirable.”8  
What has developed in and dominated the field of international 
relations theory had its beginnings centuries long ago, evidenced by 
writings describing states aligning with and against one another, 
constantly looking out for their own interests.  It is the Realist notion of 
international relations theory that suggests that states seek to achieve 
more power and are at a constant state of war with one another for it.  
Hobbes’ Leviathan is one where the Commonwealth is the provider of 
law and morality for its citizens.  The Commonwealth also needs a 
coercive power to lead it, because “men have grief in coming together if 
there is no power to overawe them.”9  As a result, a dilemma arises; even 
though most are only seeking security, citizens use coercion and power 
to help achieve it.  Accordingly, the suspicion of other states’ intentions 
will always be expected.  Hobbes argues that the ultimate state of human 
relations is a state of war where everyone is governed by individual 
reason.10  Similarly, Realist writers base much of their writings on human 
nature.  “Few contemporary realists would share Hobbes’s picture of 
human nature, but his analysis of the state of nature remains the defining 
feature of realist thought.”11 
Hans J. Morgenthau made one of the more important statements 
reflecting the views of Realists towards international relations:  “We 
assume that statesmen think and act in terms of interest defined as 
power, and the evidence of history bears that assumption out.”12  
Anarchy, according to Realists, does exist internationally and states must 
do what is necessary to protect their citizens.  In the absence of any type 
of social contract among states, and in the absence of any type of 
sovereign power, there are also no obligations in the relations of states.  
                                                 
8 David J. Bederman, Constructivism, Positivism, and Empiricism in International Law, 89 
GEO. L.J. 469, 472 (2001). 
9 KENNETH W. THOMPSON, FATHERS OF INTERNATIONAL THOUGHT: THE LEGACY OF 
POLITICAL THEORY 78 (1994). 
10 THOMAS HOBBES, THE LEVIATHAN 189 (C. B. Macpherson ed., Penguin Books 1981) 
(1660). 
11 MICHAEL J. SMITH, REALIST THOUGHT FROM WEBER TO KISSINGER 13 (1986). 
12 HANS J. MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER AND 
PEACE 5 (5th ed. 1978). 
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Rather, states are interested only in preserving themselves from harm 
and they will do anything to protect themselves.  Accordingly, the two 
prongs of Realist theory are:  (1) states act to preserve power; and (2) 
power matters more than rules.13 
In summary, Realists view the world as anarchic and lacking in any 
type of organized authority of enforcement to resolve conflicts of 
interests.  The only rational actor in the Realist system is the sovereign 
nation-state that acts out of its own self-interests in order to maintain its 
own sovereignty.  Consequently, there appears to be little room left for 
any type of organization at the international level because of the 
situation in which states exist.  
B. Institutional Theory 
The application of Institutional theory to international relations 
allows the argument that international law has a direct effect on how 
nations behave in the international community.14  For years the nation-
state alone has been considered to be the lone actor and motivator in 
global affairs.  Other groups, such as international and transnational 
organizations, also have an effect on the international system; the United 
Nations and multinational corporations are just a few of these many 
long-standing international groups.  More recently, the increasing 
strength of the European Union and international trade organizations, 
such as General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”) and North 
American Free Trade Agreement {“NAFTA”), are bringing about new 
types of cooperation.15  Formal organizations are commonplace, from the 
local level and national governments all the way up to international 
                                                 
13 Claire R. Kelly, Realist Theory and Real Constraints, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 545, 563 (2004). 
14 Rachel Brewster, The Domestic Origins of International Agreements, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 501, 
508 (2004). 
15 See BRADLY J. CONDON, NAFTA, WTO, AND GLOBAL BUSINESS STRATEGY: HOW AIDS, 
TRADE, AND TERRORISM AFFECT OUR ECONOMIC FUTURE 11-13 (2002).  Condon explains that 
NAFTA began as a free trade agreement between Canada and the United States.  Id.  
Concerns over losing Canadian sovereignty lost out to the proposed increase in 
competition caused by the agreement that would create more jobs and strengthen the 
Canadian economy.  Id.  American concerns over Mexico’s lower labor and environmental 
standards would lead to a “race to the bottom” were not as strong considering there was 
no fear of the U.S. losing its identity or sovereignty due to its strength and position in the 
agreement.  Id.; see id. at 8.  Condon argues that GATT was created by a desire to avoid 
another world war.  Id.  Organizers realized that the depression of the 1930’s which 
brought about an increase in fascism would not have occurred if the nations involved had 
experienced prosperity and been linked in international trade.  Id. 
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regimes, and all of them are “tools fashioned to address some collective 
problem.”16  
In fact, institutions are an integral part of existence from the lowest 
levels of local society to the international system.  These institutions are 
the machines that allow all levels to function together.  Institutions in 
international relations are not exclusively limited to large-scale 
organizations such as the United Nations.  Human rights conventions, 
the International Monetary Fund (“IMF”), NAFTA, and the World Trade 
Organization (“WTO”) all fall under the guise of international 
institutions.17  “An effective organization requires, at a minimum, 
substantial consensus on the functional boundaries of the group and on 
the procedures for resolving disputes which come up within those 
boundaries.”18  Autonomy and coherence are closely linked, as 
autonomy helps to establish a more coherent organization.  It is 
important that once an organization establishes itself and becomes 
autonomous, it is clear and concise in its purposes and goals.  “States 
often cooperate by creating international law and by complying with the 
commitments they have undertaken.”19 
Like all complex organizations, international regimes are purposeful 
systems constructed to achieve goals that single actors cannot achieve 
alone.  Their chief function is to make and implement joint decisions in 
order to achieve collective aims and reduce uncertainty.  The survival 
and effectiveness of long-term cooperation depends on successful 
decision formulation and implementation.  The hope of Institutional 
theory is that international treaties and agreements allow nations to 
                                                 
16 Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, Toward an Institutional Theory of Sovereignty, 55 STAN. L. 
REV. 1749, 1754 (2003). 
17 See About the International Monetary Fund, http://www.imf.org/external/ 
about.htm (last visited Dec. 20, 2006).  Founded in 1945, the IMF “was established to 
promote international monetary cooperation, exchange stability, and orderly exchange 
arrangements,” as well as “to foster economic growth and high levels of employment,” and 
to provide economic assistance to countries requiring help easing balance of payments 
adjustment.  Id.; see CONDON, supra note 15, at 9.  Between 1986 and 1993, GATT members 
met and during the Uruguay Round created the WTO.  CONDON, supra note 15, at 9.  By the 
end of the Uruguay Round, 119 countries became members of the WTO with the 
requirement for membership being acceptance of almost all of the agreements negotiated at 
the round.  Id. 
18 SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, POLITICAL ORDER IN CHANGING SOCIETIES 22 (Yale Univ. 
Press 1968). 
19 Brett Frischmann, A Dynamic Institutional Theory of International Law, 51 BUFF. L. REV. 
679, 692 (2003). 
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maintain cooperative relationships, which will ultimately lead to greater 
aggregate welfare gains for all members.20 
C. Differences Between Realists and Institutionalists 
Realist theory does not account for institutions in the international 
system.  However, Realists do not deny that states occasionally will 
cooperate through international institutions.  Instead, to Realists, states 
are acting in what is considered to be their own best interest in order to 
maintain some type of balance of power.  “[T]he most powerful states in 
the system create and shape institutions so that they can maintain their 
share of world power or even increase it.”21  In Institutional theory, 
international agreements are a means of facilitating interstate 
cooperation.  In other words, treaties are driven by nations’ 
opportunities for mutual gain at the international level and less by what 
effects the treaty would have on the domestic level.22 
Institutions provide “a set of rules that stipulate the ways in which 
states should cooperate and compete with each other.”23  The rules are 
brought about as the result of states agreeing, through some type of 
formalized agreement, to cooperate.  Institutions are not an attempt to 
create a world government; rather, “[s]tates themselves must choose to 
obey the rules they created.”24  In fact, what motivates states to act in the 
way they do is often the focal point of the argument between Realists 
and Institutionalists.  Perhaps the most famous passage that defends this 
notion of relative gains was written by Kenneth Waltz: 
When faced with the possibility of cooperating for 
mutual gain, states that feel insecure must ask how the 
gain will be divided.  They are compelled to ask not 
“Will both of us gain?” but “Who will gain more?”  If an 
expected gain is to be divided, say, in the ratio of two to 
one, one state may use its disproportionate gain to 
implement a policy intended to damage or destroy the 
other.  Even the prospect of large absolute gains for both 
                                                 
20 Brewster, supra note 14, at 508. 
21 See generally John J. Mearsheimer, The False Promise of International Institutions, INT’L 
SECURITY, Winter 1994-95, at 5-49. 
22 Brewster, supra note 14, at 508. 
23 Mearsheimer, supra note 21, at 8. 
24 Id. at 9. 
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parties does not elicit their cooperation so long as each 
fears how the other will use its increased capabilities.25  
Most significantly for this Article, human rights have played a 
significant role in United States foreign policy; however, the United 
States has been reluctant to allow international agreements to influence 
domestic policy.  This can be seen in the failure of the United States to 
ratify major human rights documents and the limited use it makes of 
those it has ratified.26  “[N]o authoritative American court has applied 
these international rules of human rights to condemn the conduct of the 
United States or any of its state and local entities . . . .”27  It appears that 
the major concern is that the terms of a human rights convention would 
allow other states to use the convention to influence the United States 
approach to human rights.  Once the United States ratifies a human 
rights convention, it is obliged to follow the obligations as required by it.  
This result is counter to the Realist notion of sovereign power:  failure to 
follow the obligations of a human rights convention would allow other 
states to take issue and proceed through channels implemented in the 
convention to enforce adherence to the convention’s requirements.28 
III.  REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL COVENANTS ON CHILDREN’S RIGHTS 
A.  A Brief Overview of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights 
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”)29 
and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(“ICESCR”)30 were both Cold War responses to human rights issues.  
Different countries, with different political and social ideologies, gave 
priority to one category over the other.  In other words, the capitalist 
                                                 
25 KENNETH N. WALTZ, MAN, THE STATE AND WAR: A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS 105 (1959). 
26 See DAVID P. FORSYTHE, HUMAN RIGHTS AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY: CONGRESS 
RECONSIDERED 27 (1988) (discussing President Carter’s decision to continue business as 
usual with Uganda’s President Idi Amin in spite of Congress’s unanimous decision to 
restrict trade with the nation). 
27 Lloyd N. Cutler, The Internationalization of Human Rights, 1990 U. ILL. L. REV. 575, 587 
(1990). 
28 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 9 (1987) 
(remedies for violations of international law). 
29 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 
available at http://www.cirp.org/library/ethics/UN-covenant/ [hereinafter ICCPR]. 
30 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 
U.N.T.S. 3, available at http://www.ohchr.org/english/law/cescr.htm [hereinafter 
ICESCR]. 
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nations in the west favored civil and political rights, and communist 
nations favored economic, social, and cultural rights.31  
The ICCPR is monitored by the United Nations Human Rights 
Committee, a group of eighteen individuals who meet three times a year 
to consider reports submitted by member states on their compliance with 
the treaty.32  Members of the Human Rights Committee are elected by 
United Nations member states, but do not represent any particular 
nation.33  Additionally, the ICCPR contains protocols whereby 
individuals in member states can submit complaints to be reviewed by 
the Human Rights Committee.34 
1. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
In 1966, the United Nations adopted two instruments protecting 
human rights, the first of which was the ICCPR.  The United States 
signed the covenant in 1977 and the United States Senate ratified the 
ICCPR on September 8, 1992.35  As of 2004, 152 total countries have 
ratified the ICCPR.36  
Article 24 of the ICCPR states that “Every child shall have, without 
any discrimination as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, national or 
social origin, property or birth, the right to such measures of protection 
as are required by his status as a minor, on the part of his family, society 
and the State.”37  Similarly, Article 26 of the ICCPR states that “All 
persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any 
discrimination to the equal protection of the law.”38  These two 
provisions guarantee a child freedom from arbitrary interferences with 
                                                 
31 J.A. Lindgren Alves, The United Nations: Postmodernity and Human Rights, 32 U.S.F. L. 
REV. 479, 498 (1998). 
32 Allison Cole, Reconceptualising Female Trafficking: The Inhuman Trade in Women, 12 
CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 789, 807 (2006). 
33 FRANCISCO FORREST MARTIN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN 
LAW: TREATIES, CASES AND ANALYSIS 228 (2006). 
34 Ambika Kumar, Using Courts To Enforce the Free Speech Provisions of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 7 CHI. J. INT’L L. 351, 354 (2006) (introducing the ICCPR 
and explaining what it does). 
35 UNITED NATIONS, OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, STATUS OF 
RATIFICATIONS OF THE PRINCIPAL INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES (June 16, 2006), 
http://www.ohchr.org/english/bodies/docs/RatificationStatus.pdf. 
36 Id. 
37 ICCPR, supra note 29, at art. 24. 
38 Id. at art. 26. 
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their liberty and to equal protection of the law.39  In contrast, the United 
States Constitution does not contain any language that is comparable to 
these provisions.40  Additionally, the ICCPR establishes that “family is 
the natural and fundamental group unit of society.”41  In 1992, President 
George H. W. Bush said of the ICCPR:  “U.S. ratification would also 
strengthen our ability to influence the development of appropriate 
human rights principles in the international community and provide an 
additional and effective tool in our efforts to improve respect for 
fundamental freedoms in many problem countries around the world.”42  
Although the ICCPR has been adopted and generally accepted, it has 
not faired well in the courts.  On June 29, 2004, Justice Souter’s opinion in 
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain negated any strict adherence of the covenant in 
United States courtrooms.43  Although the case was not related to 
children’s rights, Justice Souter declared that the covenant does not 
forcibly impose obligations on the United States as a matter of 
international law.44  In a final blow to the ICCPR, Justice Souter stated, 
“although the Covenant does bind the United States as a matter of 
international law, the United States ratified the Covenant on the express 
understanding that it was not self-executing and so did not itself create 
obligations enforceable in the federal courts.”45  Justice Souter pointed 
out that the Senate has refused to even allow federal courts to interpret 
and apply international human rights law.46  When the Senate ratified 
the ICCPR, it proclaimed that “the provisions of Articles 1 through 27 of 
the Covenant are not self-executing.”47  Furthermore, the Senate declared 
that “the Covenant will not create a private cause of action in U.S. 
Courts.”48  Thus, the Congress and the Supreme Court are in agreement 
with regard to the United States’ approach to the ICCPR. 
                                                 
39 Sanford J. Fox, Beyond the American Legal System for the Protection of Children’s Rights, 31 
FAM. L.Q. 237, 240 (1997). 
40 Symposium, The Energizing Effect of Enforcing a Human Rights Treaty, 42 DEPAUL L. 
REV. 1341, 1372 (1993). 
41 Maria Sophia Aguirre & Ann Wolfgram, United Nations Policy and the Family: 
Redefining the Ties that Bind a Study of History, Forces and Trends, 16 BYU J. PUB. L. 113, 133 
(2002). 
42 S. EXEC. REP. NO. 102-23, at 25 (1992). 
43 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739, 2767 (2004). 
44 Id. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. at 2763. 
47 138 CONG. REC. S4781-01, § I(2) (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1992). 
48 S. EXEC. REP. NO. 102-23, at 15 (1992). 
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More specifically, the juvenile death penalty was the primary issue 
regarding children’s rights that arose when discussing the ICCPR.  
Article 6(5) specifies that the “Sentence of death shall not be imposed for 
crimes committed by persons below eighteen years of age . . . .”49  When 
the United States Senate ratified the ICCPR, it reserved the right for the 
United States to “subject to its Constitutional constraints, to impose 
capital punishment on any person . . . . including such punishment for 
crimes committed by persons below eighteen years of age.”50  Of the 144 
signatories, the United States is the only country with a reservation to 
Article 6(5).51  With a growing number of countries looking at the United 
States’ refusal to adhere to this clause of the ICCPR as a violation of 
international law,52 scholars have argued that the United States’ 
reservation to Article 6(5) of the ICCPR was contrary to the object and 
purpose of the treaty.53  Consequently, the United States seemed to be 
faced with three choices in regards to the ICCPR:  (1) withdraw its 
reservations; (2) implement legislation to bring current laws into 
compliance with international law; or (3) withdraw from the ICCPR all 
together.54  However, in 2005, the United States Supreme Court 
apparently resolved the issue with its decision in Roper v. Simmons.55 
Prior to Roper v. Simmons, in 1989, in Stanford v. Kentucky,56 the 
Supreme Court had determined that “We discern neither a historical nor 
a modern societal consensus forbidding the imposition of capital 
punishment on any person who murders at 16 or 17 years of age.  
Accordingly, we conclude that such punishment does not offend the 
Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual 
punishment.”57 At the time, the United States Senate had not considered 
the ICCPR.  Regardless, the opinion in Stanford gave no indication that 
the Court ever considered looking towards the international community 
                                                 
49 ICCPR, supra note 29, at art 6(5). 
50 138 CONG. REC. S4781-01, § I(2). 
51 Erica Templeton, Killing Kids: The Impact of Domingues v. Nevada on the Juvenile Death 
Penalty as a Violation of International Law, 41 B.C. L. REV. 1175, 1186 (2000). 
52 Elizabeth A. Reimels, Comment, Playing for Keeps: The United States Interpretation of 
International Prohibitions Against the Juvenile Death Penalty—The U.S. Wants To Play the 
International Human Rights Game, but Only if It Makes the Rules, 15 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 303, 
304 (2001). 
53 Id. at 348. 
54 Id. 
55 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
56 Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989). 
57 Id. at 380. 
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to determine whether a worldwide consensus supporting the execution 
of minors existed.58  
In 2003, the Supreme Court first heard arguments in the Missouri 
case of Roper v. Simmons.59  In that case, the Missouri Supreme Court had 
predicted that “the Supreme Court of the United States would hold that 
the execution of persons for crimes committed when they were under 18 
years of age violates the ‘evolving standards of decency that mark the 
progress of a maturing society . . . .’”60  As a result, the Missouri Supreme 
Court determined that applying the death penalty to a seventeen-year-
old accused of robbery and murder would violate the Constitution’s ban 
on cruel and unusual punishment.61  
As predicted, in March 2005, the Supreme Court upheld the Missouri 
Supreme Court decision, holding that executing an offender for crimes 
committed before he was eighteen years old would be cruel and unusual 
punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.62  
The decision was 5-4; Justice O’Connor was in the dissenting group 
along with Justices Scalia and Thomas and Chief Justice Rehnquist.  In 
the majority decision, Justice Kennedy utilized international law and the 
laws of other nations in writing his majority opinion and concluded that 
“the United States now stands alone in a world that has turned its face 
against the juvenile death penalty.”63 
Perhaps expecting a strong dissent, Justice Kennedy looked back to 
several other cases where the United States Supreme Court interpreted 
aspects of the Eighth Amendment using international law in its rulings 
on cruel and unusual punishment.64  From Trop v. Dulles,65 he quoted the 
majority opinion, stating that “The civilized nations of the world are in 
virtual unanimity that statelessness is not to be imposed as punishment 
for crime.”66  From Atkins v. Virginia,67 he quoted that “within the world 
                                                 
58 Reimels, supra note 52, at 306. 
59 Roper, 543 U.S. 551. 
60 State ex rel. Simmons v. Roper, 112 S.W.3d 397, 413 (Mo. 2003) (quoting Atkins v. 
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002)) (arguing that since the United States Supreme Court had 
banned the death penalty against mentally retarded individuals in Atkins, the same 
reasoning should apply to banning the juvenile death penalty). 
61 Id. 
62 Roper, 543 U.S. at 579. 
63 Id. at 578-79. 
64 Id. at 561-62. 
65 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958) (holding that the Eighth Amendment did not permit 
Congress to take away petitioner’s citizenship as a punishment for crime). 
66 Roper, 543 U.S. at 575 (quoting Trop, 356 U.S. at 102-03) (internal quotations omitted). 
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community, the imposition of the death penalty for crimes committed by 
mentally retarded offenders is overwhelmingly disapproved.”68  
Additionally, he quoted from the plurality opinion in Thompson v. 
Oklahoma,69 its acknowledgment of the abolition of the juvenile death 
penalty “by other nations that share our Anglo-American heritage, and 
by the leading members of the Western European community,” and that 
“[w]e have previously recognized the relevance of the views of the 
international community in determining whether a punishment is cruel 
and unusual.”70  Drawing from Enmund v. Florida,71 he quoted the 
observation that “the doctrine of felony murder has been abolished in 
England and India, severely restricted in Canada and a number of other 
Commonwealth countries, and is unknown in continental Europe.”72  
Finally, Justice Kennedy quoted the plurality decision from Coker v. 
Georgia,73 stating that “It is . . .  not irrelevant here that out of 60 major 
nations in the world surveyed in 1965, only 3 retained the death penalty 
for rape where death did not ensue.”74  
Additionally, Justice Kennedy also looked to foreign sources in his 
opinion.  Specifically, he noted the United Kingdom’s abolition of the 
juvenile death penalty in 1948, long before any international covenants 
required it, and emphasized that the Constitution’s Eighth Amendment 
was modeled on British law.75  Moreover, Kennedy did not fail to stress 
the importance of the United States Constitution, noting that it “sets 
forth, and rests upon, innovative principles original to the American 
experience . . . [that are] essential to our present-day self-definition and 
national identity.”76  According to Justice Kennedy, however, 
acknowledgement of the rights of other nations “does not lessen our 
                                                                                                             
67 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (holding that the execution of mentally retarded 
individuals was cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment). 
68 Roper, 543 U.S. at 575 (quoting Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317) (internal quotations omitted). 
69 Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 830-31 (1988) (holding that the imposition of the 
death penalty on individuals under sixteen is prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments). 
70 Roper, 543 U.S. at 575-76 (quoting Thompson, 487 U.S. at 830-31) (internal quotations 
omitted). 
71 Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 796-97 (1982) (holding that allowing capital 
punishment for felony murder violated the Eighth Amendment) (internal quotations 
omitted). 
72 Roper, 543 U.S. at 576 (quoting Enmund, 458 U.S. at 796-97). 
73 Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 596 (1977) (holding that imposition of the death 
penalty for rape cases where death did not occur was cruel and unusual punishment under 
the Eighth Amendment). 
74 Roper, 543 U.S. at 576 (quoting Coker, 433 U.S. at 596) (internal quotations omitted). 
75 Id. at 577. 
76 Id. at 578. 
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fidelity to the Constitution or our pride in its origins.”77  Yet, after 
affirming the importance of the Constitution, Justice Kennedy 
nonetheless determined that it is “proper” to acknowledge international 
law regarding the juvenile death penalty and that international law 
“provide[s] respected and significant confirmation for our own 
conclusions.”78 
In light of previous statements she had made, praising the growth in 
importance of international law, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor was 
expected to cast a critical vote in the decision.  For example, on October 
27, 2004, she had been quoted as saying “International law is no longer a 
specialty . . . . It is vital if judges are to faithfully discharge their duties,” 
and that “International law is a help in our search for a more peaceful 
world . . . .”79   
Statements like these notwithstanding, Justice O’Connor rejected 
Justice Kennedy’s reasoning and wrote her own separate dissenting 
opinion, arguing that  
it defies common sense to suggest that 17-year-olds as a 
class are somehow equivalent to mentally retarded 
persons with regard to culpability or susceptibility to 
deterrence.  Seventeen-year-olds may, on average, be 
less mature than adults, but that lesser maturity simply 
cannot be equated with the major, lifelong impairments 
suffered by the mentally retarded. 80 
She did agree with Justice Kennedy, however, that the Court has used 
international law in the past in the decisions cited by him, but 
emphasized that such decisions were not surprising, given that there are 
numerous values that cross international boundaries.81 
In contrast, Justice Scalia’s dissent took on a scolding tone with 
venomous comments directed at the majority, beginning with the all-
encompassing comment that “the laws of the rest of the world—ought to 
be rejected out of hand.”82  Justice Scalia, referring to the origins of the 
Eighth Amendment from English law, noted that the United Kingdom 
                                                 
77 Id. 
78 Id. 
79 WorldNetDaily, O`Connor Praises International Law (Oct. 27, 2004), http://www.world 
netdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=41143 (internal quotations omitted). 
80 Roper, 543 U.S. at 602. 
81 Id. at 604-05. 
82 Id. at 624. 
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also has relaxed standards on illegally seized evidence and illegally 
obtained confessions, and has fewer jury trials.83  He spoke generally of 
the world community, noting that most countries have stricter 
limitations on abortion, no separation of church and state, and relaxed 
standards on admission of evidence and when jury trials may be 
demanded.84  In short, Justice Scalia portrayed the majority opinion as 
self-serving:  “To invoke alien law when it agrees with one’s own 
thinking, and ignore it otherwise, is not reasoned decision-making, but 
sophistry.”85  
In summary, the Roper Court did what the Senate refused to do 
when it ratified the ICCPR:  banned the death penalty throughout the 
United States as a punishment for offenses committed by minors.  
2. The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
The ICESCR entered into force on January 3, 1976.86  A child’s right 
to protection by the government is a positive social right under the 
ICESCR.87  Specifically, Article 10(3) of the ICESCR asserts that “Special 
measures of protection and assistance should be taken on behalf of all 
children and young persons,” and Article 12 speaks of “the right of 
everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical 
and mental health.”88 
The first major issue of the ICESCR is the right of a child to 
education.  Article 13 of the ICESCR mandates that education must be 
accessible to everyone in law and in fact.89  It also states that education 
should contribute to the “full development” of the child’s personality, 
and establishes requirements for various levels of education.90  
Additionally, Article 14 requires those states that do not provide free 
primary schooling “to work out and adopt a detailed plan of action for 
the progressive implementation . . . of compulsory education free of 
charge for all.”91  The ICESCR also requires participating states to reduce 
                                                 
83 Id. at 626. 
84 Id. 624-27. 
85 Id. at 626-27. 
86 ICESCR, supra note 30. 
87 Roper, 543 U.S. at 626-27. 
88 ICESCR, supra note 30, at arts. 10(3), 12. 
89 Id. at art 13. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. at art. 14. 
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and eventually eliminate fees until education is free from both direct and 
indirect costs.92 
Second, the ICESCR explicitly addresses the issue of child labor.  
Article 10(3) recognizes children’s right to a just and favorable working 
condition and an adequate standard of living.93  The ICESCR specifically 
states that nations should protect children from economic exploitation 
and child labor; preserve children’s health, morals, and development; 
and make the exploitation of children punishable by law.94  Arguably the 
United States is already adhering to the strict standards as applied in the 
ICESCR as it relates to child labor, both with domestic legislation and 
international agreements like NAFTA and GATT.  However, some argue 
that the United States should ratify the treaty because multinational 
corporations based in the United States are not adhering to similar 
standards in business activities abroad.95 
In 1993, Secretary of State Warren Christopher announced the intent 
of President Bill Clinton to push for ratification of the ICESCR.96  
However, some critics believe that the Republican wins in the House and 
Senate in 1994 eliminated any chance of the ICESCR being adopted.97  
Currently, the administration of President George W. Bush has yet to 
take any significant steps towards reconsidering ratification of the 
ICESCR.98  In fact, the treaty is effectively not an issue at this time and it 
does not appear it will be considered for ratification at any point in the 
near future. 
                                                 
92 ISCESCR, supra note 30, at art. 14, gen. cmt. 11: Plans of Action for Primary Education 
art. 14 (1999), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(symbol)/E.C.12.1999.4.En? 
OpenDocument. 
93 ICESCR, supra note 30, at art. 10(3). 
94 Id. 
95 See Lena Ayoub, Nike Just Does It—and Why the United States Shouldn’t: The United 
States’ Obligation To Hold MNC’s Accountable for Their Labor Rights Violations Abroad, 11 
DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 395 (1999) (proposing that the United States has a duty under 
international law to create legislation that would punish multinational corporations 
headquartered in the United States that violate the labor rights of foreign workers). 
96 Harold Hongju Koh, A United States Human Rights Policy for the 21st Century, 46 ST. 
LOUIS U. L.J. 293, 308 (2002). 
97 Id. 
98 See Natasha Fain, Human Rights Within the United States: The Erosion of Confidence, 21 
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 607, 614-15 (2003) (generally discussing the human rights record of the 
United States under George W. Bush’s administration). 
Garman: International Law and Children's Human Rights:  International, Co
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2007
674 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41 
B.  The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 
The passage of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (“CRC”) 
by the United Nations on November 20, 1989, institutionalized concepts 
of international law as it pertains to children, and brought into a single 
document many of the ideas previously separated into the ICCPR and 
the ICESCR.99  The CRC changed international law for children by 
recognizing the rights of the “whole child” and not limiting the child’s 
rights to those that related to “care and protection.”100  It came about as a 
proposal from Poland in 1978, leading up to 1979’s United Nations-
sponsored International Year of the Child.101  The CRC was opened for 
signatures on January 26, 1990, and the treaty was entered into force on 
September 2, 1990.102  As of 2004, 177 total countries have either signed 
the CRC or have become state parties to it by ratification, accession, or 
succession.103  The United States signed the convention on February 16, 
1995, but the Senate has yet to ratify it.104 
To protect the child’s interest, the CRC has four primary areas of 
concern for children:  the survival, development, protection, and 
participation rights.105  The CRC specifically states that at all levels of 
society and government, “the best interests of the child shall be a 
primary consideration.”106  Each of these rights will be discussed 
individually.   
First, survival rights require participating states to recognize an 
“inherent right to life” and to ensure to the “maximum extent possible 
the survival and development of the child.”107  Perhaps the most 
significant assurance of survival rights include access to the “highest 
                                                 
99 Susan O’Rourke Von Struensee, Violence, Exploitation and Children: Highlights of the 
United Nations Children’s Convention and International Response to Children’s Human Rights, 18 
SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 589, 590 (1995). 
100 Cynthia Price Cohen, Role of the United States in Drafting the Convention of the Rights of 
the Child: A New World for Children, 4 LOY. POVERTY L.J. 9, 10 (1998) [hereinafter Cohen, Role 
of the United States]. 
101 UNICEF, Convention on the Rights of the Child, http://www.unicef.org/crc/ 
convention.htm (last visited Oct. 18, 2005). 
102 Id. 
103 United Nations, Office of the High Commission on Human Rights, Ratifications and 
Reservations, http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/newhvstatbytreaty?OpenView&Start= 
1&Count=250&Expand=11.2#11.2 (last visited Oct. 18, 2005). 
104 Id. 
105 Von Struensee, supra note 99, at 594. 
106 Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, 44 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 49, 
U.N. Doc. A/44/736, art. 3, Nov. 20, 1989, available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/ 
menu3/b/k2crc.htm [hereinafter CRC]. 
107 Id. at art. 3. 
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attainable standard of health and to facilities for the treatment of illness” 
and that the state “ensure that no child is deprived of his or her right of 
access” to these facilities.108  
Development rights require states to ensure the children’s rights to 
an “equal opportunity” education that is “free to all.”109  States are also 
required to make higher education and vocational education “accessible 
to all.”110  And while the child is getting his free education, schools must 
be weary of administering punishment that is “in a manner consistent 
with the child’s human dignity.”111  Development rights also include a 
right of access to information.  States must recognize the right of the 
child to have access to mass media material “aimed at the promotion of 
his or her social, spiritual and moral well-being and physical and mental 
health.”112  Further, the state is required to encourage the mass media to 
create more children’s material and make it easier for children to 
understand the information being distributed.  Under the CRC, along 
with education and information, States must recognize and promote the 
right of the child to “cultural, artistic, recreational and leisure activity.”113  
Finally, the CRC requires that states respect the child’s “freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion.”114  Interestingly, this is the only clause 
discussed so far that actually brings the parents into play to “provide 
direction to the child.”115 
Protection rights in the CRC require the states to guard children 
against every evil that society may have to offer.  This includes 
protecting against economic exploitation in the workplace that is 
“hazardous or . . . interfer[es] with the child’s education.”116  To meet this 
end, states must seek measures at all levels of government to insure a 
minimum wage, proper working conditions, and proper hours.  
Protective measures must also be taken by the states to protect children 
from “sexual exploitation and sexual abuse.”117  Perhaps the most 
significant protection rights in the CRC protect children from cruelty.  
Articles 19 through 21 address instances of abuse and how the state 
should deal with it.  Specifically, Article 19 requires the state to address 
                                                 
108 Id. at art. 24. 
109 Id. at art. 28. 
110 Id. 
111 Id. 
112 Id. at art. 17. 
113 Id. at art. 31. 
114 Id. at art. 14. 
115 Id. at art. 14. 
116 Id. at art. 32. 
117 Id. at art. 34. 
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at all levels of government “measures to protect the child from all forms 
of physical or mental violence, injury or abuse, neglect or negligent 
treatment, maltreatment or exploitation, including sexual abuse, while in 
the care of parent(s), legal guardian(s) or any other person who has the 
care of the child.”118  In order to protect the child, states should make 
“effective procedures for the establishment of social programmes to 
provide necessary support for the child and for those who have the care 
of the child.”119  These programs include alternative care, such as foster 
care or adoption, that constitute “special protection and assistance 
provided by the State.”120   
Article 21 also permits adoptions and gives specific standards for 
states to monitor inter-country adoption.  Under the CRC, states must 
ensure that with all adoptions “the best interests of the child shall be the 
paramount consideration.”121  Finally, the CRC requires states to ensure 
that “No child shall be subjected to torture or other cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment.”122  This includes a ban on capital 
punishment and life imprisonment for children under eighteen.  The 
remainder of Article 37 deals with the child’s rights while being 
detained.  Specifically, any detention must be a “measure of last resort 
and for the shortest appropriate period of time.”123  If children are to be 
detained, they must be able to maintain their dignity, be separated from 
adults, maintain contact with their parents, and be able to seek out and 
receive legal representation.124 
Additionally, participation rights under the CRC provide basic 
respect for a child’s opinion.  States must ensure that children have the 
right to develop their own views and the right to “express those views 
freely in all matters affecting the child.”125  States must also ensure that 
the child has the right to “freedom of expression,”126 “freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion,”127 and “freedom of association and to 
freedom of peaceful assembly.”128 
                                                 
118 Id. at art. 19. 
119 Id. 
120 Id. at art. 20. 
121 Id. at art. 21. 
122 Id. at art. 37. 
123 Id. 
124 Id. 
125 Id. at art. 12. 
126 Id. at art. 13. 
127 Id. at art. 14. 
128 Id. at art. 15. 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 41, No. 2 [2007], Art. 4
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol41/iss2/4
2006] International Law and Children's Human Rights 677 
Along with the rights discussed above, the CRC requires 
participating states to initiate standards for various classes of children.  
Article 20 protects orphans and entitles them to “special protection and 
assistance provided by the State.”129  If for any reason a state happens to 
house refugees, children, with or without their parents, those children 
are entitled to “appropriate protection and humanitarian assistance in 
the enjoyment of applicable rights set forth in the present Convention 
and in other international human rights or humanitarian instruments to 
which the said States are Parties.”130  Mentally or physically handicapped 
children “should enjoy a full and decent life” and are entitled to “special 
care” that is to be provided by the State “free of charge.”131  The final 
class discussed in the CRC is any class considered a minority in the 
participating state, who should “enjoy his or her own culture, to profess 
and practise his or her own religion, or to use his or her own 
language.”132 
A United Nations treaty on human rights is a legal instrument but it 
is “not a ‘law’ in the ordinary sense” of the term since it does not detail 
specific rules and sanctions if and when those rules are not followed.133  
Human rights treaties, such as the CRC, have general principles, which 
must be applied by individual nations “as national law in order for the 
rights to be actualized.”134  The CRC was drafted with generalized terms 
and principles to meet the needs of various countries and cultures so 
there is no confirmed interpretation of the text; consequently, most party 
nations are forced to come to their own conclusions as to the true 
meaning.135 
The disappointing conclusion of the CRC is that the United States 
participated so heavily in its drafting, but now can do nothing to shape 
its continuing development.  Because of the United States’ involvement 
in writing the treaty, personal freedoms like freedom of expression, 
thought, religion, and assembly from Articles 13 through 16136 have 
                                                 
129 Id. at art. 20. 
130 Id. at art. 22. 
131 Id. at art. 23. 
132 Id. at art. 30. 
133 Cynthia Price Cohen, The Jurisprudence of the Committee on the Rights of the Child, 5 GEO. 
J. ON FIGHTING POVERTY 201, 202 (1998) [hereinafter Cohen, Rights of the Child]. 
134 Id. 
135 Id. 
136 CRC, supra note 106. 
Article 13 
1. The child shall have the right to freedom of expression; this 
right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart 
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displayed to the rest of the world some of the freedoms instilled in the 
Bill of Rights.  Without these “individual personality” articles, it is likely 
the rest of the world would not have had the benefit of their language.137  
Accordingly, it would seem that, with such heavy involvement by 
the United States in the construction of the treaty itself, there would be 
no problem with ratification.  Even the rules on implementation appear 
to be fairly harmless.  In United Nations human rights treaties, including 
the CRC, there “are no formal ‘enforcement’ procedures, . . . [and] no 
sanctions for failing to meet the treaties’ standards.”138  These treaties 
assume an aspect of good faith, and once a state has ratified the treaty it 
                                                                                                             
information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either 
orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any 
other media of the child’s choice. 
2. The exercise of this right may be subject to certain restrictions, 
but these shall only be such as are provided by law and are 
necessary: 
(a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others; or 
(b) For the protection of national security or of public order 
(ordre public), or of public health or morals. 
Article 14 
1. States Parties shall respect the right of the child to freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion. 
2. States Parties shall respect the rights and duties of the parents 
and, when applicable, legal guardians, to provide direction to the 
child in the exercise of his or her right in a manner consistent with 
the evolving capacities of the child. 
3. Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs may be subject 
only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are 
necessary to protect public safety, order, health or morals, or the 
fundamental rights and freedoms of others. 
Article 15 
1. States Parties recognize the rights of the child to freedom of 
association and to freedom of peaceful assembly. 
2. No restrictions may be placed on the exercise of these rights 
other than those imposed in conformity with the law and which 
are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national 
security or public safety, public order (ordre public), the 
protection of public health or morals or the protection of the 
rights and freedoms of others. 
Article 16 
1. No child shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference 
with his or her privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to 
unlawful attacks on his or her honour and reputation. 
2. The child has the right to the protection of the law against such 
interference or attacks. 
Id. 
137 Cohen, Role of the United States, supra note 100, at 39. 
138 Cohen, Rights of the Child, supra note 133, at 202. 
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is presumed that, beyond a formal report to the Committee on the Rights 
of the Child, there is no direct penalty or punishment or criticism of 
domestic law that comes into play.139  
During negotiations for the CRC, the American delegates had to 
juggle a variety of influences when making their decisions.  
Constitutional and other policy concerns were at stake causing the 
delegates to respect the demands of the Department of Justice, the 
Pentagon, the Department of Health and Human Services, and 
ultimately the United States Supreme Court.140  But considering the time 
frame in which the treaty was written, there were obvious tensions 
between the East and West.  There is clearly a taste of Western 
democracy in the CRC.141  At that time, perhaps the United States’ 
interests were less on the side of children and more on the side opposite 
the Soviet Union.142 
Has the CRC received international legitimacy with all member 
nations of the world but the United States and Somalia ratifying it?  The 
common perception around the international community is that it is not 
enough that 191 members to the CRC have ratified it because effective 
guidance of social and political actions of nations on behalf of the child 
requires full participation by all states.143  The “validity of the claims to 
legitimacy” for the articles of the CRC must be based “on a belief in the 
legality of enacted rules.”144  In other words, the common notion is that 
the CRC must become a part of the administrative, legislative, and legal 
foundations of all states to achieve full legitimacy. 
Such a transformation of international agreements and 
standards into the laws, practices, and belief systems of 
each participating nation is what is meant when the term 
“implementation” is used in the Convention itself.  Once 
we disaggregate the meaning of “implementation of the 
Convention,” the difficulties that confront such attempts 
become immediately apparent.  At stake are not only the 
good intentions of legislators, government officials, and 
                                                 
139 See generally id., for a detailed discussion of the jurisprudence of the CRC. 
140 Cohen, Role of the United States, supra note 100, at 40. 
141 Gertrud Lenzer, The Human Rights Agenda and the Rights of Children, 21 WHITTIER L. 
REV. 107, 110 (1999). 
142 Cohen, Role of the United States, supra note 100, at 40. 
143 Lenzer, supra note 141, at 108. 
144 1 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: AN OUTLINE OF INTERPRETIVE SOCIOLOGY 215 
(Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., Ephraim Fischoff et al. trans., Bedminster Press 1968). 
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administrators to honor the terms of these international 
agreements, but also the values, belief systems, customs, 
and traditional practices, which have heretofore 
governed society’s attitudes and behavior towards 
children and youth.  When it is considered in its entirety, 
the Convention both presupposes and requires 
formidable changes in the political, economic, social, and 
cultural realities of children.  These changes will often 
run against the grain of popular beliefs and practices of 
elected officials, administrators, and the generality of 
citizens.  The task of implementing the Convention goes 
far beyond the legal realms of the international 
community and nations.  The problem is to achieve 
legitimate authority for the Convention.145 
Note here, however, that the notions of Realist International theory come 
into play.   
A great deal has been said in recent years about the 
emergence of various international and transnational 
non-state actors in international politics, but it is 
generally agreed that states remain the primary actors in 
the international system.  This is certainly the case for 
human rights treaties.  States—and only states—can 
ratify such treaties, so they can be expected to play the 
most important role in drafting them.146   
In defense of United States policy towards the CRC, the Realist approach 
for now may be the better option.  “The United States government 
maintains that the reason for the sluggish pace of ratification reflects the 
degree to which it takes multilateral human rights treaties seriously.”147  
Other nations are quick to ratify the treaty but do little to follow up to 
ensure implementation, while the United States will only agree to adhere 
to the CRC when it knows it can implement and enforce the treaty 
provisions.148  This is not to say that the United States fails to see the 
merits behind an institutional approach to human rights.  In true Realist 
                                                 
145 Lenzer, supra note 141, at 109. 
146 Id. at 117 n.3 (citing LAWRENCE J. LEBLANC, THE CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE 
CHILD: UNITED NATIONS LAWMAKING ON HUMAN RIGHTS 26 (1995)) (some internal citations 
and quotations omitted). 
147 Alison Dundes Renteln, Who’s Afraid of the CRC: Objections to the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child, 3 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 629, 631 (1997). 
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fashion, however, international institutions only come into play when 
they serve to benefit the state and provide it with some relative gain.149 
Enforcement of the CRC, one would assume, would cause concern in 
the United States over possible intrusion into domestic human rights 
concerns.  In practice, however, the CRC is essentially a toothless 
agreement with no formal enforcement mechanisms on participating 
states.150  Specifically, the CRC has no provisions that allow participating 
states to file complaints on other states.  However, the CRC does create 
the Committee on the Rights of the Child that monitors the progress of 
adherence to the treaty through a series of reports submitted from 
states.151  The CRC also calls for other United Nations organs, such as the 
United Nations Children’s Fund to submit reports that are relevant to 
children’s rights issues.152  The CRC contains the assumption that all 
participating states intend to be responsible for their own actions when 
implementing the treaty and that any violations are dealt with under its 
provisions.153  As a result the CRC emphasizes “education, facilitation, 
and cooperation rather than confrontation.”154  But the CRC lacks a 
procedure for children to make individual claims of violations and any 
remedies for violations.155  The result is that the CRC has no direct 
enforcement body that can influence domestic agendas through the 
watch of any ruling committee.  Therefore, the United States’ sovereignty 
is not at issue. 
                                                 
149 See supra Part II.A (discussing Realist theory in regards to institutions). 
150 See Cohen, Rights of the Child, supra note 133, at 202. 
All United Nations human rights treaties have similar implementation 
mechanisms. There are no courts, are no formal “enforcement” 
procedures, and as previously stated, no sanctions for failing to meet 
the treaties’ standards. Nations that ratify United Nations human 
rights treaties are presumed to have done so in good faith.  Proof of 
this good faith must be exhibited in a formal report that is submitted 
periodically to a committee of experts, who have been elected in 
keeping with the particular treaty’s requirements. 
Id. 
151 CRC, supra note 106, at art. 44. 
152 Id. at art. 45. 
153 Levesque, supra note 2, at 218. 
154 Id. 
155 Id. at 219. 
Since the Convention fails to establish any concrete means of 
enforcement at the international level, it may be concluded that the 
Convention is a fundamentally weak document which places focus on 
individual Nation States enforcing the Convention themselves, rather 
than using the more traditional approach of having Nation States 
guard each other. 
Id. 
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Along with international issues and the importance of United States 
involvement in the international community there are also domestic 
political issues at play perhaps holding the CRC back from ratification.  
In 1995, the Clinton administration announced its intentions to push to 
have the CRC ratified.156  Immediately afterward, Senator Helms 
submitted a resolution to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee where 
he announced, “If the President does attempt to push this unwise 
proposal through the Senate, I want him to know, and I want the Senate 
to know, that I intend to do everything possible to make sure that he is 
not successful.”157  
Although the CRC never mentions abortion specifically, the 
inferences made in its words have become a heated source of right-
versus-left arguments regarding ratification of the treaty.  As Article 6 of 
the CRC recognizes an “inherent right to life” for the child, one would 
think that it would be supportive of the anti-abortion movement.  The 
problem appears to be that Article 1 of the CRC recognizes a child as any 
“human being below the age of eighteen years[,]” but does not recognize 
any bottom age.  So the question of whether a child becomes a viable 
human being at conception is not answered.  Some have interpreted the 
provisions of the CRC to impose a position on abortion; however, “the 
history of the drafting process indicates that the treaty was drafted in 
such a way as to enable each State party to determine its own policy 
regarding abortion.”158 
Education and discipline provisions of the CRC are other sources of 
heated domestic political debate.  Article 29 of the CRC requires states to 
direct the child’s education towards understanding “human rights and 
fundamental freedoms” and to develop respect for “cultural identity” of 
the child’s own country and “civilizations different from his or her 
own.”159  This led to concern by conservative groups that this would 
allow the state to prevent parents from teaching children according to 
their religious beliefs.160  In regard to discipline, Article 19 of the CRC 
requires States to take measures to end all “forms of physical or mental 
violence, injury or abuse, neglect or negligent treatment” and Article 28 
requires states to “ensure that school discipline is administered in a 
                                                 
156 Ambassador Madeleine Albright, Remarks at the State Department Conference on 
Crises (Apr. 3, 1995) (available on LexisNexis with key words “Ambassador Madeleine 
Albright” and “Remarks at the State Department Conference on Crises”). 
157 S. Res. 133, 104th Cong. (1995). 
158 Renteln, supra note 147, at 634. 
159 CRC, supra note 106, at art. 29. 
160 Renteln, supra note 147, at 634. 
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manner consistent with the child’s human dignity.”  Many have 
interpreted these clauses to mean an end to spanking at home and 
corporal punishment at school.161 
Abortion, education, and discipline are all major issues, but the real 
issue is the rights of parents to raise their children as they see fit.  Senator 
Jesse Helms has been quoted as saying “the United Nations Convention 
on the Rights of the Child is incompatible with the God-given right and 
responsibility of parents to raise their children.”162  The natural first place 
to look is at the individual rights of Article 13, freedom of expression; 
Article 14, freedom of thought, conscience, and religion; Article 15, 
freedom of association and peaceful assembly; Article 16, right to 
privacy; and Article 17, access to information.  Conservative groups feel 
that “[w]hile these types of rights are acceptable for adults, they are 
objectionable for children.”163  Interestingly, despite all the concerns over 
parents’ rights to raise their children as they see fit Article 5 specifically 
ensures that “States Parties shall respect the responsibilities, rights and 
duties of parents.”164 
Perhaps the most unfortunate aspect of the failure to ratify the CRC 
is that the United States had such an involved role in the CRC, but is not 
bringing the CRC’s rules back home.  Because the United States has not 
ratified the CRC and become a state party to the convention, it cannot 
take part in developing it and seeing to its adherence in the international 
community.  No American delegate can be elected to the Committee on 
the Rights of the Child until the United States ratifies the CRC.  As a 
result, any future interpretation and implementation of the articles of the 
CRC will take place without the United States’ involvement.  Finally, and 
perhaps the most hypocritical action by the United States, is a report 
published by the Department of State regarding human rights violations 
around the world, including violations of the CRC.165 
                                                 
161 Id.; see CRC, supra note 106, at arts. 19, 28. 
162 S. Res. 133, 104th Cong. (1995). 
163 Renteln, supra note 147, at 634. 
164 CRC, supra note 106, at art. 5. 
165 Cohen, Role of the United States, supra note 100, at 40. 
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IV.  CONFLICTS OF LAW:  THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE, CONVENTIONAL LAW, 
AND CUSTOMARY LAW 
A. The Supremacy Clause and International Law 
In a merging of Realist thought and Institutionalism, the United 
States continues to participate in international lawmaking as a means of 
protecting national interests.166  The issue is to what extent the United 
States will relinquish its sovereignty for the sake of international 
relations.  More specifically, the conflict of international law lies in the 
potential undermining of United States sovereignty by subjecting the 
nation to the will of others, which is in direct opposition to the 
democratic notion that “people choose the rulers and the rules that 
govern them.”167  
The Supremacy Clause of the Constitution is clear that treaties will 
become the supreme law of the land, regardless of the involvement of 
other foreign nations.168  The Supremacy Clause and the constitutional 
treaty power allow the President and the Senate to create federal law 
without the involvement of the House of Representatives, even though 
Article I states that “[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted” are vested in 
Congress as a whole.169  The Constitution confirms the significance of 
this delegated power, by both granting treaties the force of federal law 
under the Supremacy Clause and expressly denying to the states any 
authority to negotiate treaties on their own.170  The same section also 
prohibits states, without the consent of Congress, from concluding “any 
Agreement or Compact . . . with a foreign Power.”171  Finally, the 
Constitution’s description of the judicial power in Article III includes the 
final branch of government in treaty interpretation.  Section 2 of Article 
III provides that “The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law 
and Equity, arising under . . . Treaties made, or which shall be made” 
under U.S. authority.172  Once the President signs the treaty and the 
                                                 
166 T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Thinking Outside the Sovereignty Box: Transnational Law and the 
U.S. Constitution, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1989, 1990 (2004). 
167 Id. at 1991. 
168 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.  “[A]ll Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the 
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land.”  Id. 
169 Id. at art. I, § 1, cl. 1; id. at art II, § 2, cl. 2 (providing that the President shall have the 
power to make treaties “by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, . . . provided 
two thirds of the Senators present concur”). 
170 Id. at art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (prohibiting the states from entering “into any Treaty, Alliance, 
or Confederation”). 
171 Id. at art. I, § 10, cl. 3. 
172 Id. at art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
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Senate ratifies it, the responsibility of interpretation and application to 
specific cases and controversies lies with the federal courts. 
While what the framers of the Constitution intended was clear at the 
time, it is questionable as to whether that intent remains.   
[H]istoric patterns of expectation demonstrate that most 
of the Framers intended all treaties immediately to 
become binding on the whole nation, superadded to the 
laws of the land; to be observed by every member of the 
nation; to be applied by the courts whenever a cause or 
question arose from or touched on them; and to prevail 
over and preempt any inconsistent state action.173   
Chief Justice Marshall wrote several of the more significant opinions 
regarding the application of international law.  In 1801, he broadly stated 
that:  “If the law be constitutional, . . . I know of no court which can 
contest its obligation.”174 In 1809, he again wrote:  “Whenever a right 
grows out of, or is protected by, a treaty . . . it is to be protected.”175  In 
several cases decided through 1829, treaty law was considered on equal 
footing with federal law, especially in the face of inconsistent state law.176   
Then, in 1829, the United States Supreme Court considered one of 
the most significant cases regarding treaty-making power and the 
Supremacy Clause.  The Supreme Court established in Foster v. Nelson177 
that, in addition to the Constitution or Acts of Congress, treaties of the 
United States also may operate as directly applicable federal law.178  
Specifically Chief Justice Marshall compared the United States’ approach 
to treaties with other nations: 
A treaty is, in its nature, a contract between two nations, 
not a legislative act.  It does not generally effect, of itself, 
the object to be accomplished . . . but is carried into 
execution by the sovereign power of the respective 
parties to the instrument.  In the United States, a 
different principle is established.  Our constitution 
                                                 
173 Jordan J. Paust, Self-Executing Treaties, 82 AM. J. INT’L L. 760, 764 (1998). 
174 United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. 103, 110 (1801). 
175 Owings v. Norwood’s Lessee, 9 U.S. 344, 348 (1809). 
176 Paust, supra note 173, at 765. 
177 See Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253, 314 (1829) (holding that a treaty is “to be regarded in 
courts of justice as equivalent to an act of the legislature, whenever it operates of itself 
without the aid of any legislative provision”). 
178 See id. 
Garman: International Law and Children's Human Rights:  International, Co
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2007
686 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41 
declares a treaty to be the law of the land.  It is, 
consequently, to be regarded in courts of justice as 
equivalent to an act of the legislature, whenever it 
operates of itself without the aid of any legislative 
provision.179 
According to Chief Justice Marshall’s reasoning, the Supremacy Clause 
“automatically turns treaty obligations into U.S. law.”180  This notion of a 
self-executing treaty bypasses legislative review and allows federal 
“courts to interpret treaties directly without interference from the 
executive or legislative branches.”181 
Foster carries great significance in international law and the 
Supremacy Clause because it started the great debate over self-executing 
and non-self-executing treaties.182  Marshall declared that a treaty is 
“carried into execution . . . . whenever it operates of itself.”183  This 
means that a self-executing treaty is operable at signing and a non-self-
executing treaty requires further domestic action to become executed.  
Marshall maintained that every treaty was “the law of the land,” but his 
suggestion that some treaties did not operate automatically created a 
problem.  To be a self-executing treaty, the measurement as to whether 
or not it was to be “carried into execution” was to be the language of the 
treaty itself.  It was to be carried into execution “whenever it operates of 
itself,” and it was not to be self-executing if the language of the treaty 
read as such.  More specifically, the test that Marshall created in Foster to 
determine whether a treaty was self-executing or non-self-executing was 
as follows: 
(1) Self-executing Treaty:  “all treaties, to the extent of 
their grants, guarantees or obligations . . . .” 
                                                 
179 Id. 
180 David N. Cinotti, The New Isolationism: Non-Self Executing Declarations and Treaties as 
the Supreme Law of the Land, 91 GEO. L.J. 1277, 1287 (2003). 
181 John C. Yoo, Treaty Interpretation and the False Sirens of Delegation, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1305, 
1314 (2002). 
182 See Christopher A. Britt, The Commissioning Oath and the Ethical Obligation of Military 
Officers To Prevent Subordinates from Committing Acts of Torture, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 551, 
562-63 (2006). 
183 Foster, 27 U.S. at 314. 
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(2) Non-Self-executing Treaty:  “those, which, by their 
terms, required domestic implementing legislation . . . to 
produce direct legal effect.”184  
Generally, Chief Justice Marshall’s test has significant acceptance even in 
the recent case law above and it is generally considered in line with the 
intent of the Constitution’s framers.185  His test is simple in context:  all 
treaties, to the extent of their grants, guarantees, or obligations, are self-
executing.  Non-self-executing treaties, by their terms, require domestic 
legislation or otherwise express an intention that they not be self-
executing. 
In Foster, Chief Justice Marshall classified treaty provisions as self-
executing and non-self-executing based on the nature of the international 
legal obligation embodied in the treaty.186  Marshall’s standard for 
distinguishing between self-executing and non-self-executing treaty 
provisions lies is the nature of the international legal obligation.187  He 
assumed that different domestic legal consequences would flow from 
different types of treaty obligations.  An executed treaty provision 
“operates of itself without the aid of any legislative provision.”188  In 
contrast, “the legislature must execute” a non-self-executing treaty 
provision “before it can become a rule for the court.”189  If the treaty 
requires immediate performance as a matter of international law, it is 
self-executing.  A treaty provision is non-self-executing if a participating 
state must accomplish a result in the future, some time after signing the 
treaty; however, neither requires nor prohibits any particular action 
immediately upon entry into force.190  In other words, a treaty that 
obligates the United States to take unspecified steps toward achieving an 
agreed upon objective at an unspecified future time requires action by 
the political branches in order to execute the treaty. 
What is most interesting about the Constitution is that it nowhere 
states that treaties must come into force through legislative action 
through Article I.  As a result, this so-called self-executing treaty can 
become a powerful document that operates as federal law even without 
                                                 
184 Paust, supra note 173, at 768. 
185 Id. at 775. 
186 Foster, 27 U.S. at 314-15. 
187 David Sloss, Non-Self-Executing Treaties: Exposing a Constitutional Fallacy, 36 U.C. DAVIS 
L. REV. 1, 21-22 (2002). 
188 Foster, 27 U.S. at 314. 
189 Id. 
190 Sloss, supra note 187, at 22. 
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a vote of the House of Representatives.  In the 1984 case, Trans World 
Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., the Supreme Court described a self-
executing treaty as one where “no domestic legislation is required to 
give the Convention the force of law in the United States.”191 In 1888, in 
Whitney v. Robertson, the Supreme Court held that treaty provisions are 
self-executing when they “require no legislation to make them 
operative”:192 
By the Constitution a treaty is placed on the same 
footing, and made of like obligation, with an act of 
legislation.  Both are declared by that instrument to be 
the supreme law of the land, and no superior efficacy is 
given to either over the other.  When the two relate to 
the same subject, the courts will always endeavor to 
construe them so as to give effect to both, if that can be 
done without violating the language of either; but if the 
two are inconsistent, the one last in date will control the 
other, provided always the stipulation of the treaty on 
the subject is self-executing.193 
Whitney and Foster go hand in hand when considering treaties—the 
Constitution stops automatic conversion of a particular international 
legal rule into domestic law,194 but if there is an existing rule of 
constitutional law, a treaty in conflict has no domestic legal force because 
the Constitution will always take precedence over a treaty.195  
Constitutional questions really appear to be the primary concern 
with treaty-making.  Specifically, there are three considerations when 
measuring a treaty against the Constitution.  First, constitutionally 
protected individual rights of a United States citizen will always take 
precedence over a treaty.196  Second, the treaty power is subject to 
federalism limitations.197  Finally, under the Supremacy Clause, a treaty 
provision cannot automatically become primary domestic law because 
the Constitution limits the treaty-makers’ power to create primary 
domestic law by specifying that treaties are the “supreme Law of the 
Land” only if they are “made, under the Authority of the United 
                                                 
191 Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 252 (1984). 
192 Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888). 
193 Id. 
194 Sloss, supra note 187, at 29, 31. 
195 Doe v. Braden, 57 U.S. 635, 657 (1853). 
196 Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1957). 
197 See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 432-34 (1920). 
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States.”198  All three of these provisions can be summed up by 
concluding that if a treaty interferes with constitutionally protected 
individual rights, states’ rights, or Congress’s lawmaking powers it does 
not become primary law.199  Even if a treaty is considered to supersede 
domestic law, the Supreme Court placed a fail-safe in the process by 
declaring that “A treaty may supersede a prior act of Congress, and an 
act of Congress may supersede a prior treaty.”200 
B.  Conventional Law 
The rule governing the relationship between treaties and domestic 
law is set out in the United States Constitution.  Article VI, clause 2 
states:  
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States 
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all 
Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the 
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law 
of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound 
thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any 
State to the Contrary notwithstanding. 
Clause 2 of Article VI thus creates the notion of conventional 
international law being binding upon the United States domestic law.  
Section 2 of Article II sets out the following requirements for a treaty to 
be binding:  “He [the President] shall have Power, by and with the 
Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds 
of the Senators present concur . . . .”  As discussed above, the Supreme 
Court has distinguished between self-executing and non-self-executing 
treaties, such that self-executing treaties, “intended to take effect in 
United States law, will in fact be interpreted and applied in United States 
courts.”201 
The Supreme Court has clearly taken the obligations of the United 
States in the international community seriously once a convention has 
been ratified.  In an early case from 1804, Justice Marshall indicated that 
domestic law should be construed in such a way as to avoid a violation 
of the international obligations of the United States, regardless of 
                                                 
198 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
199 Sloss, supra note 187, at 31. 
200 The Cherokee Tobacco Case, 78 U.S. 616, 621 (1870). 
201 Anne Bayefsky & Joan Fitzpatrick, International Human Rights Law in American Courts: 
A Comparative Perspective, 14 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1, 42 (1992). 
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whether the treaty was self-executing or non-self-executing.202  This 
proposition was followed in 1913 by an opinion by Justice Day in 
MacLeod v. United States, which held that: 
The statute should be construed in the light of the 
purpose of the Government to act within the limitation 
of the principles of international law, the observance of 
which is so essential to the peace and harmony of 
nations, and it should not be assumed that Congress 
proposed to violate the obligations of this country to 
other nations, which it was the manifest purpose of the 
President to scrupulously observe and which were 
founded upon the principles of international law.203 
The ICCPR is one of the few human rights conventions ratified by 
the United States and it is subject to declarations of non-self-execution.  It 
appears that this treaty will become the standard approach with future 
human rights treaties.204  Consider that when ratifying the ICCPR, the 
United States Senate attached the following declaration:  “The United 
States declares that the provisions of Articles 1 through 27 of the 
Covenant are not self-executing.”205  The Senate may condition its 
consent to a treaty by amending its resolution of ratification by adding 
material through means of a reservation, understanding, interpretation, 
declaration, or statement.206  The Senate may also amend the resolution 
of ratification and insert a conditional requirement that the President, 
upon ratification, amend the treaty.207  
In regard to human rights treaties, conventional law that has been 
ratified by the United States and is non-self-executing will likely 
continue to face difficulty becoming a direct source of domestic rights.208  
As all human rights treaties are “non-self-executing at the time of 
                                                 
202 Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64, 118 (1804). 
203 MacLeod v. United States, 229 U.S. 416, 434 (1913). 
204 Bayefsky & Fitzpatrick, supra note 201, at 42 (explaining that “[t]wo of the few major 
human rights treaties . . . ratified by the [U.S.] . . . were subject to declarations of non-self-
execution”). 
205 S. REP. NO. 102-23, at 23 (1997).  Articles 1 through 27 are the rights-granting 
provisions of the ICCPR; Articles 28 through 41 establish and create responsibilities for a 
Human Rights Committee.  Id. 
206 S. REP. NO. 106-71, at 124 (2001); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF 
THE UNITED STATES § 314 (1987). 
207 S. REP. NO. 106-71, at 124 (2001); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF 
THE UNITED STATES § 314 (1987). 
208 Bayefsky & Fitzpatrick, supra note 201, at 45. 
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ratification,” they will “remain presumptively unenforceable.”209  The 
two options are that Congress can pass legislation enacting a treaty or 
the judiciary can extend itself into foreign affairs.  Unfortunately, both 
seem unlikely. 
C. Customary International Law 
Customary international law is one of the two sources of 
international law.  Along with the conventional law of treaties, 
customary law makes up the bulk of international law rules.210  Although 
there are a large number of arguments regarding customary 
international law, scholars have apparently agreed at least in part on the 
definition as being “(1) the general practice of States, which is (2) 
generally accepted as law by States.”211  In other words, while 
conventional law of treaties is contractual in nature, customary law 
requires state practice guided by a legal obligation to the international 
community.  It is the application and duration of these two elements that 
eventually allows customary international law to become binding.  
Customary international law has typically “covered areas of 
international law such as the laws pertaining to territory, immunities, the 
law of the sea, and the use of force by one State against another.”212 
Additionally, customary international law “descended from the ‘law of 
nations,’”213  and “[i]n its broadest usage, the law of nations comprised 
the law merchant, maritime law, and the law of conflicts of laws, as well 
as the law governing the relations between states.”214  In 1900, in Paquete 
Habana,215 the Supreme Court held that “where there is no treaty, and no 
controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be 
had to the customs and usages of civilized nations . . . .”216  This notion 
that customary international law is part of the federal common case law 
                                                 
209 Timothy K. Kuhner, Human Rights Treaties in U.S. Law: The Status Quo, Its Underlying 
Basis, and Pathways for Change, 13 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 419, 422 (2003). 
210 Daniel H. Joyner, A Normative Model for the Integration of Customary International Law 
into United States Law, 11 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 133 (2001). 
211 Michelle M. Kundmueller, The Application of Customary International Law in U.S. Courts: 
Custom, Convention, or Pseudo-Legislation?, 28 J. LEGIS. 359 (2002). 
212 Joyner, supra note 210, at 134. 
213 Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common 
Law:  A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815, 822 (1997). 
214 Stewart Jay, The Status of the Law of Nations in Early American Law, 42 VAND. L. REV. 
819, 821-22 (1999). 
215 The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900). 
216 Id. 
Garman: International Law and Children's Human Rights:  International, Co
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2007
692 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41 
has dominated much of the scholarly debate in recent years,217 and 
although its words are quite clear, this “modern approach” to customary 
law is currently being brought into question. 
The so-called “modern position” on customary international law has 
based its rationale on general acceptance of customary international law 
as being part of the federal common law.218  Additionally, the modern 
position appears to also have gained wide support in the federal 
courts.219  The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United 
States suggests that “the modern view is that customary international 
law in the United States is federal law and its determination by the 
federal courts is binding on the State courts.”220  
The criticisms of the modern position are that customary 
international law has achieved equal ground with federal common law, 
it “preempts inconsistent state law pursuant to the Supremacy Clause,” 
and it can even “supersede prior inconsistent federal legislation.”221  The 
traditional understanding of customary international law “governed 
relations among nations, such as the treatment of diplomats and the 
rules of war.”222 Interpretations of the modern position tend to 
demonstrate regulations of the relationship between a nation and its 
citizens, particularly prohibition against torture, genocide, and slavery, 
as well as applying economic and social rights.223  
It is also argued that the sources of customary international law have 
changed from the norms that states practice towards “General Assembly 
resolutions, multilateral treaties, and other international 
pronouncements.”224  The result is that customary law is motivated less 
                                                 
217 Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 213, at 816; see Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 
376 U.S. 398, 425 (1964) (concluding that the act of state doctrine must be treated 
exclusively as a matter of federal law). 
218 Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 213, at 816. 
219 See id. at 817 n.3 (citing Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 246 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 
116 S. Ct. 2524 (1996)) (It is a “settled proposition that federal common law incorporates 
international law.”) (internal quotations omitted); see In re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos 
Human Rights Litig., 978 F.2d 493, 502 (9th Cir. 1992) (“It is . . . well settled that the law of 
nations is part of federal common law.”); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 193 (D. 
Mass. 1995) (“[I]t is well settled that the body of principles that comprise customary 
international law is subsumed and incorporated by federal common law.”). 
220 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 111 
(Reporters’ Note 3) (1987). 
221 Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 213, at 817. 
222 Id. at 818. 
223 Id. 
224 Id. at 839. 
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by a consensus of states and more by a majority, which results in a 
country being forced to apply norms that are not part of either domestic 
practice or of international agreements with which the country has 
concurred.225  These norms then become relied upon, instead of evidence 
of consistent state practices and proof that most states accept the norms 
as being legally binding on them.226  
Along with criticism of the modern position come suggestions for 
change.  The so-called “revisionist” approaches vary greatly.  The first 
argument is that customary international law is not a source of federal 
law and is not binding on the states under the Supremacy Clause.  As a 
result: 
(1) “[A] case arising under [customary international 
law] would not by that fact alone establish federal 
question jurisdiction.” 227   
(2) Federal court interpretations of customary 
international law would not be binding on the federal 
political branches or the states. 228   
(3) If a state chooses to incorporate customary 
international law into state law, then the federal courts 
would be bound to apply the state interpretation of 
customary international law on issues not otherwise 
governed by federal law. 229   
(4) If a state did not, in fact, incorporate customary 
international law into state law, the federal court would 
not be authorized to apply customary international law 
as federal or state law.230  
The second argument is that customary international law should be 
abandoned altogether as a source of international law because it 
“undermines the integrity of the international legal system which in turn 
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encourages disrespect for the entire system of international law.”231  A 
third argument is that customary international law should only be used 
“when its application can be satisfactorily justified on the basis of an 
independent domestic source of authority.”232 
Adopting any of these revisionist proposals would represent not 
only a dramatic shift in traditional thinking about customary 
international law, but also strike a blow to the international human 
rights movement, particularly the children’s rights movement, which has 
sought to rely on customary international law to impose norms through 
the courts of the United States. 
V.  THE FUTURE OF THE CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD 
The United States participated heavily in drafting the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child, creating unlimited possibilities for children 
around the world.  The insistence of the United States delegation to 
include Articles 13 through 16 regarding individual rights and child 
participation has had beneficial effects around the world as children take 
more active roles in education, civics, and the media.233  With such heavy 
involvement in the drafting of the Convention, it is unfortunate that the 
United States cannot participate in its continued implementation, 
especially since the CRC has become an important part of international 
human rights.234  
The CRC is “one of the most significant steps taken toward 
improving the lives of children throughout the world.”235  It appears that 
the real work began after the treaty was written, as activists and 
advocates have strived for universal ratification by the party nations and 
have put pressure on those nations to adopt laws and policies to 
implement the provisions of the CRC.236  Much of the attention on the 
CRC has been focused on ratification and implementation by the United 
States.  Although there have been domestic political issues as previously 
discussed, perhaps another reason for the delay in ratification is a 
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general lack of knowledge of the treaty by the professional community 
and the general public in the United States.237   
The role of children, and their continued development, is important 
to the future of the United States and the world at large.  The CRC strives 
to accomplish a mutual respect among adults and children with 
particular focus on the worth of the child as a vital part of society.  This 
would result in recognition of the dignity, development, and valued 
opinion of the child.238  Ultimately it is the choice of individual nations to 
interpret the CRC.  If approached with a positive eye towards mutual 
respect for the rights of the child, the United States would be viewed as 
stronger, and ultimately more respected, in the eyes of the global 
community.  The CRC is in the best interest of the future of all mankind 
because of its safeguarding of the health, survival, and progress of 
children.239 
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